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Abstract 
 
Studies of framing in the EU political system are still a rarity and they suffer from a lack of 
systematic empirical analysis. Addressing this gap, we ask if institutional and policy contexts 
intertwined with the strategic side of framing can explain the number and types of frames 
employed by different stakeholders. We draw on framing theory, policy analysis and a 
conception of the European Union as a multilevel system to develop our arguments about the 
impact of contexts and strategy on the framing dynamics in EU financial market regulation 
and environmental policy. We use a computer assisted manual content analysis and develop a 
fourfold typology of frames to study the frames that were prevalent in the debates on four EU 
policy proposals at the EU level and in Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom. The main empirical finding is that both contexts and strategies exert a significant 
impact on the number and types of frames in EU policy debates. In conceptual terms, the 
article contributes to developing more fine-grained tools for studying frames and their 
underlying dimensions.  
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Framing theory suggests that since every policy issue has multiple potential dimensions, 
framing – selecting and emphasizing particular aspects of an issue – is an important tool for 
policy actors (Daviter 2009; Baumgartner and Mahoney 2008). Through framing, policy 
actors can play a crucial independent role in public policy debates and impact on their 
outcomes (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). While commonly accepted in American political 
science, this phenomenon is still under-researched in EU studies (exceptions are Daviter 
2009; Klüver, Mahoney, Opper 2015). We know rather little about the emergence and 
variation of frames in the EU, especially with regard to the contextual factors that impact on 
these frames. The lack is surprising in two respects. On the one hand, the argumentative turn 
in policy analysis highlighted the centrality of arguments – and therefore frames – ‘in all 
stages of the policy process’ (Majone 1989: 1). On the other hand, scholars rooted in different 
schools of thought agree that the institutional contexts of political systems filter the 
arguments, problems and solutions that find entry into the political process (see for example: 
Schattschneider 1960: 30).  
Why can European Union (EU) studies in particular benefit from a framing perspective? The 
EU policymaking system is characterised by contested competencies and competing 
constituencies. It is frequently difficult to predict how key actors will align on a given issue 
and which cleavages will matter most in determining outcomes (Peterson 2001). In this 
context, frames do not only help to make sense of ‘amorphous, ill-defined problematic 
situation[s]’ (Dudley/Richardson 1999: 226), but are also at the centre of the political conflict 
because they can ‘empower certain actors over other actors’ (Harcourt 1998: 370). Studying 
framing can therefore improve the accounts of EU policy processes and outcomes (see also 
Daviter 2011).  
Page 2 of 26Journal of European Public Policy
3 
 
In this study, we focus on what we label ‘essential frames’ in EU policymaking. These 
capture what the actors involved in an EU policy debate perceive to be the essential elements 
in the EU’s policy proposals. We contend that focusing on the types and numbers of essential 
frames yields important insights into EU policy-making. Highlighting the different types of 
essential frames sheds lights on what EU policies are actually about. Focusing on the number 
of essential frames illuminates the complexity of the policy problem, the magnitude of the 
conflict and the potential shifts of attention during the policy debate. Addressing the research 
gap on contextual factors that influence the emergence and variation of frames in the EU, we 
focus on two contextual factors: (1) the institutional context and (2) the policy context. 
However, taking account of the insight that public policies emerge from  the strategic 
interaction of policy actors (see Scharpf 1997: 11), we pay also attention to the strategic 
element in framing processes and explore if (3) the strategic highlighting of major policy 
aspects impacts on the types and numbers of essential frames in EU policy debates. 
In our empirical analysis, we classify the identified essential frames along two dimensions. 
On the one hand, we distinguish among generic and specific frames (see de Vreese 2005). On 
the other hand, we separate institutional from policy frames to analyse the impact of the 
contextual factors. We study these frames in the debates on four EU policy proposals which 
were initiated between 2008 and 2010. We focus on two environmental policy debates and 
two instances of financial market regulation. Our research design includes not only variation 
across and within policy areas, but also across the EU and the national levels as well as across 
four member states (Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).  
Our contribution to the debate is not only in the focus on different types of essential frames 
and in disentangling contextual effects from strategic action, but also in the methodological 
approach to the study of policy frames. Till now the majority of research on frames in public 
policymaking was conducted through case studies based on interviews or document analyses 
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(see for example: Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Daviter 2009). A new trend of research uses a 
quantitative approach, focused on word scores and cluster analysis (see for example: Klüver, 
Mahoney and Opper 2015). We combine both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The 
basis of our study is a computer assisted manual content analysis (for details see: Boräng et al 
2014) that was conducted on a sample of policy documents. The codes obtained from the 
content analysis were then transformed into numerical data to perform comparative statistical 
analyses on them.  
The article proceeds as follows. In the next section, we illustrate our theoretical framework 
and develop the hypotheses that guide the empirical analysis. Afterwards, we explain our 
research design, followed by a presentation of the empirical analysis. First, we present the 
fourfold typology of frames that highlights which essential frames emerged in the four policy 
debates and demonstrates their correspondence with the EU’s institutional characteristics and 
the two policy areas. Secondly, we present statistical models that seek to account for the 
number and types of frames in each debate. We conclude with a summary of our results and a 
discussion of the broader implications of our findings. 
1. The emergence and variation of frames in the EU multilevel system 
Frames can relate to different aspects of policy proposals. In our study, we identify through 
document analyses what the actors participating in EU policy debates perceive to be the 
essence of the European Commission’s directive proposals (see also Boräng et al. 2014). 
These frames are likely to impact on the positions of the actors as well as the policy outcomes 
because they denote what ‘actors perceive to be at stake’ in these proposals (Daviter 2009: 
1118). We subdivide these essential frames in four different types along two dimensions. 
First, drawing on previous framing studies, we distinguish among generic and specific frames. 
Whereas specific frames are tied to the political issue at hand, generic frames can be applied 
across policy areas, some even over time and, potentially in different cultural contexts (de 
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Vreese 2005). The former capture issue specific aspects of frame selection, organization, and 
elaboration while the latter offer less possibility for examining the framing of an event in 
great detail, but facilitate comparisons of framing practices between issues and countries (de 
Vreese 2005: 109). Incorporating both specific and generic frames in our analysis serves to 
improve our understanding of the common themes and the more specific aspects of EU policy 
debates. Secondly, to increase our knowledge about the filtering effects of political 
institutions and policy areas, we distinguish institutional frames that are derived from the 
institutional setting and relate to the general rules of the EU political system from policy 
frames that relate to substantial policy goals, norms, and instruments, thus leading to a 
fourfold classification scheme of generic institutional frames, specific institutional frames, 
generic policy frames, and specific policy frames. Given our interest in the impact of the 
institutional and policy contexts, these merit a more detailed discussion before we move on to 
framing strategies and the role of strategic action.   
1.1 Institutional context – the EU as a multilevel governance system 
There exists a widely shared system of rules and procedures in the European Union’s political 
system that defines who the actors are, how they make sense of each other’s actions, and what 
types of actions are possible (Stone Sweet et al.  2001: 12). These institutions embody a set of 
‘normative and cognitive structures’ (Surel 2000: 509), and they include a number of public 
policies and a wide repertoire of policy instruments. An important element of this institutional 
setting is the strong focus on the creation, maintenance, and policing of the internal market 
through regulatory policies (Majone 1996). We argue that this institutional context filters the 
frames that emerge in EU legislation, promoting the emergence of frames related to market 
integration, regulation and policy harmonization while being for example less permeable to 
redistributive frames. These institutional frames matter in most EU policy areas even if their 
relevance may vary across policy proposals. We term those generic institutional frames, 
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which relate to the general rule system of the EU political system and those specific 
institutional frames that refer to more detailed rules such as specific regulatory instruments.  
Conceptualising the European Union as multilevel system generates the expectation that 
actors at different levels will engage in framing and that the actors’ frames will differ 
depending on the level on which actors are situated as well as across national sub-units in this 
system. We expect that generic institutional frames will be mostly used at the European level. 
At that level, the multilevel character of the EU enforces a large dose of cooperation and 
coordination between stakeholders (Marks 1993: 402). Here, the need for policy entrepreneurs 
who take skilled action to construct or revise frames is extremely high. Authors agree that this 
crucial role is often played by the European Commission (Stone Sweet et al. 2001; Daviter 
2009). Frequently, the Commission frames policy proposals in a way that is meant to bring 
together the relevant political and societal actors as well as decrease the amount of conflict 
between them. As default these frames have to be more generic than specific. Departing from 
the assumption that a variety of policy advocates engages in a framing competition to shape 
EU legislation, we suggest that other EU level actors such as the European Parliament or EU 
level interest groups must also take account of the high consensus requirements in the EU 
political system if the policy status quo is to be changed. Thus, they also will employ generic 
institutional frames. 
In contrast, the stance of national actors on EU policy proposals depends much more on 
national interests and the degree to which already existing national regulation would have to 
be adjusted to new EU regulation (Green Cowles et al. 2001: 12-14). Major institutional 
characteristics of the EU member states vary in important ways: their varieties of capitalism 
in terms of coordinated and liberal market economies (Hall and Soskice 2001), their welfare 
states in the form of liberal, corporatist, and social-democratic welfare regimes (Esping-
Andersen 1990) and their patterns of interest mediation in the corporatist and pluralistic 
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modes (Lijphart 2012). Accordingly, their national borders should promote different problem 
views and a rivalry over policy solutions which need to be accommodated in EU 
policymaking. Taking in consideration the variety of national circumstances, it is not a far 
leap to expect that actors from different member states will invoke different frames when 
responding to EU policy proposals. In sum, we derive the following conjectures from the 
EU’s institutional multilevel- context: 
Hypothesis 1.1: EU level actors employ fewer frames than national actors.  
Hypothesis 1.2: EU level actors employ generic institutional frames more 
frequently than the national actors. 
Hypothesis 1.3: The number and the types of frames invoked vary across EU 
member states. 
1.2 Policy context 
Drawing on policy studies leads to the expectation that we will identify generic policy frames 
that matter across policy areas such as frames about market integration or consumer safety, 
but also frames that relate specifically to environmental policies, to financial market policies, 
to education policies, etc. (specific policy frames). The high degree of functional segmentation 
both in the EU institutions and in the member states’ political systems is likely to contribute 
to the emergence of specific policy frames, because the actors in different policy sub-systems 
develop their own rationality criteria over time. Nonetheless, according to the logic of the EU 
multilevel setting, we anticipate that national actors invoke more specific policy frames in 
order to defend or elaborate their specific national policy settings than the EU level actors 
which tend to rely to a greater extent on generic policy frames to work towards a consensus 
among the involved stakeholders or organizational members. 
Another important insight from the policy studies is the distinction between policy areas that 
operate, by and large, in a routine mode of policy-making or within widely accepted policy 
trajectories and policy areas that are in a state of or in the aftermath of a crisis. Many policy 
studies suggest that external shocks and crisis situations can challenge prevailing policy 
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principles and instruments, forming windows of opportunity and giving rise to paradigm 
shifts (for a useful discussion, see Surel 2000). Bojn et al. (2009: 82) suggest that ‘the 
aftermath of a crisis and its outcomes can be usefully understood in terms of “frame contests” 
between the various actors that seek to exploit this crisis-induced opportunity space (…). 
Crisis typically generates a contest between frames and counter-frames concerning the nature 
and severity of a crisis, its causes, the responsibility for its occurrence, or escalation, and 
implications for the future’.  
To gauge the relevance of policy areas for framing activities, we analyse two policy proposals 
in the area of financial market policy and two proposals in the area of environmental policy. 
Financial market regulation presently undergoes a paradigm shift towards a more detailed, 
stricter and comprehensive regulation that is meant to strengthen the stability of financial 
markets and the protection of consumers and investors. This shift was triggered by the Global 
Financial Crisis in 2007 and meets, in part, with strong national opposition. In comparison, 
EU environmental policymaking is well established and its evolution towards stricter 
standards for climate protection is connected to that of international environmental policy 
regimes. Even though specific policy decisions may be contested, the broad trajectory of EU 
environmental policy is widely accepted. Today’s measures focus more on setting substantial 
goals rather than on prescribing strict policy instruments thus allowing for more flexibility for 
the addressees. We thus expect that:   
Hypothesis 2.1: EU level actors employ specific policy frames less frequently 
than national actors. 
Hypothesis 2.2: EU level actors employ generic policy frames more frequently 
than national actors. 
Hypothesis 2.3: Financial market regulation is marked by a larger number and 
a greater variety of frames than environmental policy. 
 
1.3 Strategic action 
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Next to institutional and policy context, the number and types of frames can be also 
dependent on the strategic choices of actors. The institutional and the policy contexts do not 
fully determine what aspects of EU policy proposals actors highlight. Policy actors are neither 
merely acting out contextually defined scripts nor are they ‘rule-following automata’ (Scharpf 
1997: 11, 21). Entman’s influential definition of framing also emphasizes the intentional side 
of framing processes: ‘To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make 
them more salient in a communicating text…’ (Entman 1993: 52, our emphasis).  
Conceiving of framing as purposeful action within the boundaries of contextual settings has 
important implications. Given this assumption, the amount of actors that become vocal in a 
policy debate cannot be taken as a structural given but is the outcome of these actors’ 
calculations to engage in that debate. Considering that each actor is specifically located within 
the EU’s institutional and policy context yields the expectation that the number of frames 
tends to increase with the number of actors that become vocal on a policy proposal. This 
proposition modifies the expectation (see Schattschneider 1960: 16-17) that actors employ 
frames to widen the scope of the conflicts. In contrast, we claim that efforts at framing or 
reframing EU policy proposals aim not so much at increasing the number of participants in 
the policy debates, but at putting into question the scope, validity, or legitimacy of others’ 
arguments. Due to the lack of a European public, strategic framing is usually not aimed at 
bringing larger publics into EU legislative processes but at shifting the debate. A testable 
implication of this proposition is that a greater number of actors in EU policy debates is 
associated with a rising number of frames in these debates. In contrast, the number of frames 
need not increase if framing is mostly aimed at widening the scope of conflicts: One frame 
may be enough to appeal to a broad public.  
To deepen our analysis of the strategic element in framing processes, we draw further on 
Entman’s (1993: 52) definition of frames. He suggests that frames serve four purposes: they 
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promote a particular definition, causal diagnosis, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation of a problem. Evidently, all four aspects can be related to what the policy 
actors believe to be essential in EU policy proposals and therefore increase the number of 
frames. In order to explore to what extent actors highlight these aspects and how they are 
related to the actors’ essential frames, we operationalize them as follows: First, we expect that 
actors will put forward expert evidence as well as arguments about the urgency of the policy 
proposal when defining the underlying problem, suggesting either that this merits the 
proposed EU activities or that it does not. We anticipate that arguments defining the problem 
are associated with the usage of institutional frames that highlight the EU’s capacity and its 
legitimacy to take action, be they specific or generic. Secondly, with regard to the causal 
analysis of the underlying problem and the proposed solutions, it is likely that policy 
advocates put forward arguments about how their interests are connected to the policy 
proposals. We anticipate that this causal analysis connects policy frames, be they generic or 
specific, with the actors’ interests. Thirdly, the actors’ moral judgements are embodied in 
normative arguments about the EU policy proposals. These moral arguments can be 
associated with an increased usage of both policy and institutional frames that relate to the 
general EU rule system or to more specific policy principles and norms. Fourthly, many 
actors will single out the remedial capacity of the policy proposals in terms of their social 
welfare effects or the burdens they might impose. These remedial arguments should be 
associated with a greater usage of specific policy frames. Given the tentative character of the 
preceding discussion, we make the following three general propositions about the impact of 
actor density and the strategic highlighting of policy aspects on the one hand, and essential 
frames, on the other: 
Hypothesis 3.1: The more actors are involved in a policy debate, the greater is 
the number of frames and the more types of frames are invoked. 
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Hypothesis 3.2: The number of frames in a public policy debate increases with 
each highlighted policy aspect (problem definition, causal aspect, moral 
aspect, remedial aspect).  
 
Hypothesis 3.3: The policy aspects are connected in different ways with the 
four types of frames in the policy debates. 
 
 
2. Research design  
We test these hypotheses in a comparative study of four EU policy debates at the EU level 
and in four EU member states, namely Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom. This selection of countries controls important national characteristics but assures 
also reasonable variation with respect to country size, duration of EU membership, varieties 
of welfare state and capitalism, and the state-interest group model (see Hall and Soskice 2001; 
Lijphart 2012; Esping-Andersen 1990). Given that earlier studies identified a substantial 
impact of such structural differences on policy preferences in EU politics (see Ringe 2005), 
we expect to observe different types and numbers of frames across the four countries.  
As part of the larger INTEREURO project on interest group politics (for further information, 
see Beyers et al. 2014), we selected the four policy proposals in our study based on the 
following criteria. Of all European Commission directives that were introduced between 2008 
and 2010, we identified 20 policy proposals which were mentioned in at least one of two 
European level media source (Agence Europe, European Voice) and two of three national 
level outlets (Financial Times, Le Monde, or Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung) to ensure the 
presence of both EU level and national level policy debates.  
Our two financial market directive proposals are: the directive proposals on alternative 
investment fund managers (AIFM – European Commission 2009) and deposit guarantee 
schemes (DGS – European Commission 2010). The former aimed at harmonizing the 
requirements for entities engaged in the management and administration of alternative 
investment funds. It was proposed in June 2009 and passed the EU’s legislature one year later. 
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The latter was introduced in 2010 to revise earlier legislation on this subject. It was meant to 
protect savers and to prevent bank runs in case of a bank’s bankruptcy as well as to harmonize 
national deposit protection schemes. The European Parliament passed the directive in April 
2014, based on an agreement that was reached in the trilogue with the Commission and the 
EU Council in December 2013. 
The two environmental cases are part of the EU energy and climate package. They focus on 
the disposal of electrical and electronic waste (WEEE - European Commission 2008a) and on 
the promotion of the use of renewable energy resources (RED - European Commission 
2008b). The RED directive proposal aimed at establishing an overall binding target of 20% 
share of renewable energy sources in energy consumption and of 10% for the use of biofuels 
in transport to be achieved by each member state by 2020. The directive was proposed in 
January 2008 and passed the EU’s legislative process in June 2012. The WEEE proposal was 
introduced to revise an earlier directive from 2003, addressing mostly the administrative 
problems and costs caused by that directive. The recast proposal was tabled in December 
2008 and passed in July 2012.  
To study the frames, we relied on a computer assisted qualitative content analysis (supported 
by the software MAXQDA). This method has the advantage that it can be applied to 
documents in different languages and allows the study not only of the manifest meanings and 
frequencies of words, but also of their latent and contextual meanings (e.g. Schreier 2012). 
Six coders analysed the content of the policy documents. Krippendorff's alpha for inter-coder 
reliability was 0.739, with an 87.44% agreement. 
We developed a comprehensive codebook consisting of a series of questions to focus on while 
analysing the policy documents to study the actors’ frames. Given the function of frames to 
reduce complexity, we identify what the authors of the documents perceived to be the essence 
of the EU directive proposals. To identify these frames, the coders marked those passages in 
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the selected texts which indicated: ‘What the author of the text thinks is at stake in this 
proposal at a more general level?’ After identifying these passages, we categorized the coded 
frames on the one hand as generic or specific frames, and on the other hand as institutional or 
policy frames. Furthermore, we transformed the identified codings into numerical data to 
facilitate the systematic comparison of these frames across policy proposals.  
The total number of essential frames and the sums of the different types of essential frames 
invoked in the policy debates are our dependent variables. Our explanatory variables are also 
derived from the coded documents and actors. They cover the location of the actors in the EU 
multilevel system (EU level or national level), the policy context (financial or environmental 
policy), the density of interest groups that mobilized on each policy proposal, and the strategic 
highlighting of the four policy dimensions. These variables have been coded independently 
from the ‘essential’ frames and are described in table 1. Furthermore, we include control 
variables for the extent of change a policy proposal is perceived to bring about (routine 
change or major change), the policy position an actor assumed (in favour or against a 
proposal), and the type of actor who voiced the frame (public interest group, business interest 
group, EU actors, state actors, institution, or firm). 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
     
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1 Descriptive evidence 
Using the EU level and the national governments’ and parliaments’ databases, media and web 
mining, we identified the public and private stakeholders that were involved in the four policy 
debates. In total, we collected 704 documents from 443 actors. Based on the populations of 
actors involved in the four policy debates, the number of documents in each debate, and the 
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positions the actors held, we drew a stratified sample of documents for the content analysis. 
This procedure resulted in a sample of 278 documents written by 307 actors, among them 76 
German actors, 73 Dutch actors, 42 Swedish actors, 67 British actors, and 49 EU level actors. 
266 actors presented one policy document, and 41 actors tabled 15 joint position papers. 
Among these 41 actors were 25 Dutch groups, 11 German organizations, and 5 British groups. 
About 79% of the documents are position papers drawn up by interest groups, think tanks and 
companies, the rest being government studies, expert reports, etc.  
In this sample, 60%, or 184 out of the 307 policy actors mention an essential frame of the 
proposal. 36 of these used three to six frames, 46 referred to two frames, and 102 mentioned 
just one frame. The bulk of the actors mentioning more than two frames were involved in the 
two financial market proposals: 27 relative to nine such actors in EU environmental policy.  
Table 2 lists the distribution of frames across the four policy debates. In total, we identified 14 
essential frames in these debates. In the debate on the WEEE directive, seven frames 
mattered, in the debates on the RED and the DGS directives we identified eight frames, and in 
the debate on the AIFM directive nine frames played a role. This is not only preliminary 
evidence that EU policy proposals address complex problems, but also that EU policy debates 
are framing competitions in which actors seek to steer policy debates in their preferred 
direction. As suggested, generic institutional frames play an important role in both EU policy 
areas. They are the most common type of essential frame in the four debates and have been 
used 136 times, underlining that the EU’s rule system weighs heavily on the types of frames 
that emerge in EU policy debates. Frames related to EU regulation and harmonization as well 
as the administrative (and economic) burdens attributed to the EU policies emerged in all four 
policy debates. The frames on the implementation of EU policies and on information and 
transparency were also important in both policy areas, but not in all four policy debates. As a 
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highly specific institutional frame, the setting of mandatory targets was used only in one 
proposal (for the promotion of renewable energies) and played here a major role.  
Policy frames were more confined in their scope than the institutional frames. Generic policy 
frames were mentioned only 53 times. And of these frames, only market integration was 
highlighted in both policy areas. Both the health and the employment frames mattered in just 
one policy debate, and the consumer safety frame was invoked in just one policy area and two 
policy debates. In contrast to our expectations, generic policy frames seem to contribute to 
substantial differences among the policy areas. Specific policy frames were used more 
frequently (97 times) and could be identified in both policy areas: Financial market stability 
played an important role in the debates on the AIFM and the DGS directive proposals. The 
environment frame guided the debates on the WEEE and the RED directive proposals while 
the climate and the energy frame mattered only in the latter. In sum, generic institutional 
frames have a unifying effect in terms of EU policy debates, while, apart from the market 
integration frame, both generic and specific policy frames contribute to their diversity.  
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
3.2  Accounting for the number and types of frames in EU policy debates 
We analyse the impact of the explanatory variables by means of Poisson regressions in four 
models, because we have four dependent variables: (1) the total number of frames invoked by 
an actor, (2) the number of generic institutional frames, (3) the number of generic policy 
frames, and (4) the number of specific policy frames invoked by an actor.
1
 These are count 
variables that are not overly dispersed. The top panel in table 3 presents the regression results. 
Raw coefficients are Poisson regression coefficients. The figures in brackets are standard 
errors. The significance levels are based on two-tailed tests. The bottom panel presents the 
                                                
1
 We did not calculate a model for the specific institutional frame ‘mandatory targets’ because it was invoked by 
only a very small number of actors in the RED case and because it is a binary variable. 
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summary statistics of the maximum likelihood estimations. All models are statistically 
significant, and it appears that the model explaining the extent of generic policy frames works 
better than the models accounting for the overall number of frames and the other types of 
frames.  
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
The evidence presented in table 3 indicates the major characteristics of the framing patterns in 
the EU policy debates. First, the framing patterns of European and national actors display 
important commonalities. In contrast to hypotheses 1.2 and 2.2., EU level actors do neither 
resort to generic institutional frames nor to generic policy frames in any other way than 
national actors. Note also that the national actors do not differ in their use of generic 
institutional frames. As they are part of the common mode of thinking and common language 
in EU policymaking, it is common for all actors to employ generic institutional frames in EU 
policy debates. National policy advocates are no exception to this pattern. Hence, a substantial 
portion of the frames that actors invoke in EU policymaking are shaped by the EU’s 
institutional terms of debate. 
Beyond these common characteristics, the multilevel institutional context triggers important 
cross-level and cross-national differences. EU level actors employ a smaller number of frames 
than those national actors that form the reference category (Swedish actors) which supports 
hypothesis 1.1. As expected in hypothesis 2.1., EU level actors engage also fewer specific 
policy frames than national actors. Being located at the apex of national political or 
associational systems, EU level actors tend to bridge national heterogeneity and aggregate the 
disparate policy frames of their members. Their interest aggregation function lets them 
highlight fewer frames than the national actors who voice their positions based on their 
domestic institutional and policy contexts and the interactions in EU policy-making. Through 
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the use of specific policy frames, national actors draw attention to their domestic policy 
settings. 
Furthermore, the national contexts prompt important cross-national differences, as we 
expected in hypothesis 1.3. British and German policy actors invoke fewer frames than 
Swedish actors, and British and Dutch policy advocates use fewer generic policy frames than 
Swedish actors. All in all then, the cross-national differences apply to just one type of frame 
(generic policy frames) and to the overall number of frames that national actors invoke. Note 
also that there is no clear-cut connection between the national institutional characteristics 
(modes of interest mediation, welfare state regimes, and varieties of capitalism) and the 
essential frames that the national actors employed in the four policy debates. Either these 
characteristics do not matter (at least not in the areas of financial market regulation and 
environmental policy), and are more limited in scope than is frequently claimed, or the 
differences across the institutional sectors within these countries counteract each other.  
The policy context proves highly influential for the frames employed in EU policy-making. 
The general characteristics of policy areas impact decisively on these frames. The actors in 
EU environmental policymaking invoke fewer frames, in particular fewer generic policy 
frames, than the actors in EU financial market regulation which is evidence in favour of 
hypothesis 2.3. We attribute these differences to different policy origins and trajectories. The 
reregulation of financial markets has a major exogenous policy origin: the global financial 
crisis has opened up new courses of action and put into question established policy paradigms. 
EU environmental policy has more gradually evolved since the 1980s and not been subject to 
such a paradigm change in recent years.  
Finally, as expected, the strategic decisions of actors leave an imprint on the frame types and 
numbers. Taking into account framing strategies on top of institutional and policy context 
clearly helps accounting for EU framing dynamics. First, interest group density leaves its 
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mark on the nature of political debates even though not as uniformly as we envisaged. The 
more actors decide to engage in a policy debate, the more frames are invoked which supports 
hypothesis 3.1. Note also that the more actors are involved, the more policy oriented the 
debate becomes, both in terms of generic and specific policy frames. Correspondingly, the 
denser the actor population, the fewer references do the actors make to the generic 
institutional aspects of the EU political system.  
Next, hypothesis 3.2 about the association between the different policy aspects and the 
number of essential frames in the policy debates finds empirical support. The strategic 
highlighting of a major aspect of a policy proposal raises the number of essential frames. 
Furthermore, as expected, the four policy aspects bear differently on the four types of 
essential frames that we distinguish (hypothesis 3.3). Two aspects have a rather narrow scope 
in that respect. Highlighting the remedial aspect of EU policies is a proposal-specific framing 
strategy that increases only the number of specific policy frames. Emphasizing the problem 
definition is associated with an increased usage of generic institutional frames. The other two 
aspects have a broader scope. Arguments about the causal aspect of EU policies are associated 
with an increased use of both generic and specific policy frames, but are not linked to the 
usage of institutional frames. Finally, actors highlighting the moral dimension of EU policy 
proposals invoke both specific policy frames and generic institutional frames. In sum, only 
one of the four aspects is associated with an increased usage of both policy and institutional 
frames (moral aspects). Highlighting other policy aspects increases the density of either 
institutional frames (problem definition) or policy frames (remedial and causal aspects). More 
generally, policy advocates emphasize those policy aspects that are related to what they 
perceive to be essential in EU policymaking in order to impact on the outcome of EU 
legislation.  
4. Conclusions 
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This article studies the effect of contextual factors and of the strategic highlighting of 
different policy aspects on the types and number of essential frames that have emerged in four 
EU policy debates. We distinguished among four types of essential frames: generic 
institutional frames, generic policy frames, specific institutional frames, and specific policy 
frames. Our results indicate that the EU’s institutional and policy contexts exert a significant 
impact on the invoked frames. The EU’s institutional context gives rise to the most common 
type of frame in EU politics, namely generic institutional frames about EU regulation or 
harmonization. The policy context gives rise to the second most common type of frame:  
specific policy frames are often invoked by national actors that point to their national policy 
settings. Furthermore, policy areas in the aftermath of a crisis such as financial market 
regulation experience more intense frame contests than those in which policy-makers operate 
in a less turbulent policy context such as environmental policy.    
The article also highlights the strategic component of framing. Policy advocates are not forced 
by the institutional and policy contexts to employ certain frames; they can, at least in part, 
select which policy aspect they highlight. However, their discretion to highlight different 
policy aspects varies with what they find to be essential in EU policymaking as our empirical 
analysis has shown. Actors subscribing to generic institutional frames would draw attention to 
the definition of the policy problem as well as the moral aspects of the policy proposal. 
Generic policy frames limit the argumentative space even more: they are mostly a vehicle for 
arguments about the causes and effects of the proposed policies in connection with 
constituency interests. Specific policy frames have the broadest dimensionality; actors point 
out normative, causal, or remedial policy aspects when invoking this type of frame. Relating 
the four frame types systematically to different policy aspects is meant to be a first step in the 
development of a more fine grained analysis of frames and their underlying dimensions as 
they are invoked in public policymaking.  
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Finally, we demonstrate that the more actors become involved in the policy debates, the more 
the frame competition intensifies. In the EU’s contested policy space, it is difficult for 
individual actors to win the day with their frames. Framing is likely to lead to counter-framing 
and particularly to a greater variety of specific policy frames because these lend themselves to 
emphasizing various aspects of EU policy proposals. Hence, the outcome of such a conflict 
expansion is rather uncertain.   
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Table 1 The definition of the independent variables 
Concept Variable definition 
Institutional context 
EU level actors 1=EU level actors, 0=Swedish actors  
EU member states  Three dummy variables for German, British, and Dutch actors (reference 
category: Swedish actors)  
Policy context 
Policy area 1=Environment, 0=Finance and Economy 
Strategic action 
Interest group density Number of actors vocal in a policy debate 
Problem definition: 
policy urgency 
2=arguments referring to expert evidence and the urgency of the proposed 
measures, 1=arguments referring to expert evidence or the urgency of the 
proposed measures, 0=no such arguments 
Causal aspects: 
constituency interests 
2=arguments referring to the interests of policy addressees and the EU 
public, 1=arguments referring to the interests of policy addressees or the EU 
public, 0=no such arguments 
Moral aspects: 
normative justification  
2=arguments referring to broad common goals and universal norms, 
1=arguments referring to broad common goals or universal norms, 0=no 
such arguments 
Remedial aspects: costs 
and benefits  
2=arguments referring to the distribution of costs and benefits and the social 
benefits of the proposed measures, 1=arguments referring to the distribution 
of costs and benefits or the social benefits of the proposed measures, 0=no 
such arguments 
Control variables 
Policy position  Two dummy variables for a position in favour of the proposed policy 
changes and for a position opposed to the proposed policy changes 
(reference category: actor has no clear or neutral position)  
Extent of perceived 
policy change 
1= actor perceives major change or entirely new policy, 0=actor perceives 
incremental or routine change 
Type of actor Four dummy variables for public interest groups, business interest groups, 
firms, institutions (reference category: EU and national state actors) 
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Table 2 Essential frames in EU policymaking 
  
 
 
Frames  WEEE RED AIFM DGS Total  
Generic institutional frames      
Implementation 3 0 1 1 5 
Regulation 7 3 26 2 38 
Harmonization 5 11 18 29 63 
Administrative and economic 
burdens 
9 4 9 1 23 
Information and transparency 0 3 1 3 7 
Specific institutional frame      
Mandatory targets 0 24 0 0 24 
Generic policy frames      
Market integration 2 0 4 5 11 
Employment 0 0 2 0 2 
Consumer safety 0 0 6 37 43 
Health 2 0 0 0 2 
Specific policy frames      
Financial market stability 0 0 9 26 35 
Environment 16 23 0 0 39 
Climate 0 7 0 0 7 
Energy 0 16 0 0 16 
Total 47 91 76 104 316 
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Table 3 Accounting for essential frames in EU policy debates: Poisson regressions 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Total number 
of frames 
No. of generic 
institutional frames 
No. of generic 
policy frames 
No. of specific 
policy frames 
Institutional and policy context     
German actors -0.465** -0.360 -0.759 -0.531 
 
(0.215) (0.331) (0.512) (0.429) 
Dutch actors -0.121 0.021 -0.739** -0.001 
 
(0.106) (0.159) (0.325) (0.200) 
British actors -0.132** -0.118 -0.271** -0.115 
 
(0.056) (0.085) (0.138) (0.109) 
EU level actors -0.099*** -0.085* -0.071 -0.123** 
 
(0.029) (0.044) (0.064) (0.058) 
Policy area -1.764*** 0.304 -5.259*** -1.811* 
 
(0.487) (0.731) (1.28) (0.992) 
Strategic action     
Interest group density 0.029** -0.038** 0.068** 0.053** 
 
(0.012) (0.019) (0.032) (0.025) 
Problem definition  0.301*** 0.393*** 0.324 0.141 
 (0.095) (0.148) (0.253) (0.176) 
Causal aspects 0.291*** 0.184 0.462** 0.380** 
 (0.090) (0.139) (0.212) (0.165) 
Moral aspects 0.316*** 0.304** 0.290 0.416** 
 
(0.087) (0.136) (0.219) (0.152) 
Remedial aspects 0.267*** 0.026 0.264 0.416** 
 
(0.100) (0.169) (0.248) (0.178) 
Control variables     
Policy position:  -0.046 -0.096 -0.020 0.045 
support of policy (0.153) (0.234) (0.427) (0.273) 
Policy position:  -0.066 -0.133 0.448 -0.111 
opposition to policy (0.149) (0.222) (0.344) (0.298) 
Actor type:  0.157 -0.133 -0.653 -0.281 
public interest group (0.238) (0.365) (0.601) (0.445) 
Actor type:  -0.392* -0.358 -0.338 -0.405 
firm (0.223) (0.359) (0.553) (0.378) 
Actor type:  -0.079 0.118 -0.453 -0.268 
business interest group (0.191) (0.294) (0.472) (0.352) 
Actor type:  -0.283 -0.470 0.961 -0.143 
institution (0.257) (0.444) (0.826) (0.403) 
Policy change 0.148 -0.027 -0.229 0.543 
 (0.142) (0.220) (0.353) (0.277)** 
Constant -1.494* 1.860* -4.587** -4.801*** 
 (0.772) (1.128) (2.062) (1.564) 
N 307 307 307 307 
LL Intercept -422.381 -266.374 -158.810 -216.787 
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LL Full model -363.779 -228.274 -103.524 -185.067 
LR Chi
2
 (17) 117.205 76.200 110.573 63.440 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Pseudo R
2
 0.138 0.143 0.348 0.146 
Note: * significant at p = 0.1, ** sig. at p = 0.05 sig. at p = 0.01.  
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